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The Ebola crisis of 2014, though concentrated most heavily in three small 
countries in western Africa, awoke the international community to its lack of effective 
health crisis infrastructure. As the disease rocked the globe, multinational groups 
scrambled to help those directly affected and protect the overwhelming majority of 
people not directly affected. Most preventative measures failed, and pre-existing 
initiatives to stem the flow of the disease only served to open the floodgates more. After 
careful examination of the literature surrounding medical, cultural, financial, national, 
and global circumstances enabling Ebola to flourish, as well as applying individual 
analysis and examination, it is evident certain changes must be made.  




Diagnosing an International Health Crisis: 
A Structural Exploration of Ebola 2014 
On December 6, 2013, a two-year-old boy died in Guéckédou, a small border 
town in Guinea, in western Africa (Grady & Fink, 2014). Though unfortunate, the death 
at the time was not newsworthy. However, long after his passing, scientists around the 
world searched for him, calling him by a name he had never known: Patient Zero. 
This Patient Zero was the catalyst for a devastating outbreak of Ebola virus 
disease, an illness with no known cure or vaccine that kills up to 90% of infected 
persons (“Ebola virus,” 2015). Unfortunately, this diagnosis was not made until March of 
2014, after dozens of Guinean towns and cities had already been affected as well 
(Grady & Fink, 2014); by that time, the disease had also been discovered in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and elsewhere in western Africa, with no signs of slowing or stopping.  
The incurability of Ebola and illnesses like it suggests outbreaks such as these 
are unavoidable. Further problems associated with disease outbreaks are equally 
difficult, if not impossible, to solve: most of the affected countries are infamous for poor 
health infrastructure, sporadic and fruitless communication, and a general distrust for 
formal doctors and hospitals. Development and improvement of health infrastructure in 
the region is often ineffective because of rampant corruption.  
Though Liberia was declared free of Ebola on May 9, 2015, the threat of new 
cases hangs over communities (“The Toll,” 2015). Due to suspicion surrounding modern 
medicine and poor rural connection, estimates of those affected are difficult to obtain; 
still, the World Health Organization, or WHO, found over 28,000 confirmed cases and 
11,000 deaths since March 2014, with more likely to come (“Ebola Virus,” 2015). 




Thus, an international health crisis was born. 
 Yet, this was not Ebola’s debut on the international stage. In 1976, it struck the 
citizens of Yambuku, Democratic Republic of Congo, near the Ebola River from which 
the disease gets its name (“Ebola Virus,” 2015). Since then, scientists have tracked 
twenty-four other controlled and uncontrolled outbreaks, with some as few as one 
confirmed case (“Outbreaks Chronology,” 2015). Their report reveals the 2014 outbreak 
includes more confirmed cases than every past outbreak combined (“The Toll,” 2015). 
This comparison of past to present Ebola outbreaks poses an important question: 
if the medical aspects of the virus remain the same with few variations (as Ebola has 
since its discovery), how could the consequences of one epidemic differ so dramatically 
from another? That is, the problem surrounding Ebola 2014 was its ability to defy 
medical and structural history and theory about how epidemics affect countries, 
communities, and individuals; how did 2014 break the curve? 
The international community has a responsibility to consider these large-scale 
impacts, even in outbreaks like Ebola 2014, where only a handful of states were 
significantly impacted. Tens of thousands of lives have already been lost; who knows 
how many more will be at stake if this crisis is allowed to go on without careful analysis? 
In answering, the international community must then ask: what has changed in 
terms of the political and social factors surrounding the 2014 outbreak?  
The circumstances surrounding Ebola 2014 spoke volumes to the preparedness, 
or lack thereof, of local communities, nations, and even the global community when an 
epidemic strikes.  As participants in an increasingly globalized international community 
which will likely be affected by another outbreak of Ebola 2014’s caliber, doctors, 




politicians, leaders, and citizens alike have a responsibility to consider potential 
changes made to how we respond to epidemiological disasters, prompting the research 
question: What could have prevented the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and what can it teach 
us about future outbreaks? 
Literature exists on the 2014 Ebola epidemic that explains certain aspects of the 
outbreak as they apply to different spheres of understanding, five of which will be 
broken down here. It is paramount to consider these challenges through a solution-
oriented lens, which necessitates consideration of certain epidemiological changes 
made over time; however, the overwhelming majority of this analysis will discuss and 
suggest solutions rather than causes or effects. 
Examining these works by breaking analysis down into five areas of literature 
review mixed in with investigation enables a more cohesive and thorough appreciation 
of what Ebola 2014 looks like from medical, cultural, financial, national, and global 
perspectives. 
Medicine 
 Ebola 2014 is, at its most fundamental, a medical catastrophe created by poor 
health practices. It is worth noting that though the strain present in Ebola 2014 being a 
particularly virulent one, the disease has not developed or changed much over time 
(Fauci, 2014). Despite Ebola’s resistance to inoculation and cure, it is entirely 
preventable and in some cases very treatable. How did prevention and treatment slip 
through the cracks to enable the disastrous medical consequences of Ebola 2014? 
First and foremost, though Ebola is nearly impossible to root out because of its 
ability to infect multiple types of animals, it is avoided by implementing healthy daily 




routines, such as handwashing and sanitation of food and water. Proper sanitation 
procedures were not in place around the time the outbreak began (Garrett, 2014). Ebola 
is an extremely highly communicable disease and should be treated as such (Arwady 
et. al., 2015); taking small but effective precautions such as antibacterial soap is the first 
step in stemming the spread and growth of any illness. 
Additionally, part of the answer lies in a lack of trained medical professionals in 
the area. In terms of raw numbers, there simply were not, and are not, enough nurses, 
doctors, and volunteers to go around. The United States, for example, enjoys about 245 
doctors per 100,000 people, whereas Guinea only has ten per 100,000 (“The Toll,” 
2015). This is a funding issue, so the specific implications of the lack of doctors will be 
more effectively explored later in this document. Not only did these countries suffer from 
a lack of doctors, they also dealt with a lack of proper training for those few medical 
professionals. Unsurprisingly, countries like Guinea and Sierra Leone did not sport the 
highest-paid or most renowned medical schools or staff, making it difficult to draw talent 
to the area. Doctors Without Borders noted one of their biggest projects in Guinea 
particularly was establishing a then-absent component of the Ebola 2014 response – 
infection surveillance and control protocol (“Ongoing Challenges,” 2015). The presence 
of Doctors Without Borders here spoke volumes to the lack of preparedness in medical 
training and personnel in and of itself, and the challenges were only further exacerbated 
by poor training. Officials with training, therefore, must be present in later outbreaks, 
such as Dr. Thierno Souleymane Diallo, a Guinean doctor once infected with Ebola now 
treating those with the disease (Aribot & Horowitz, 2015). Dr. Diallo’s insight as a doctor 




and survivor makes him an invaluable asset for future battles against Ebola, but most 
importantly, he is valuable because of his training and willing presence. 
Similarly, the poor state of medical offices and hospitals were partly to blame as 
well. Keep in mind Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, the three most affected countries 
in Ebola 2014, were also battling other endemic health concerns, such as malaria and 
diseases that bear close symptomatic resemblance to Ebola (Fauci, 2014). Experts 
assert large-scale threats from occurrences like Ebola 2014 are limited primarily to 
countries with weak public health systems; this is due to the poor health system itself, 
as well as the fact that they are often based in countries made up of small, ill-connected 
communities (Siedner et al., 2015). Connecting these small communities is particularly 
important, as rural communities tend to be at particular risk because of their lack of 
connection to formal health infrastructure (McGinnis, Williams-Russo, & Knickman, 
2002). Laboratories are a necessary part of local health infrastructure, as they provide 
testing and short-term treatment options for patients; however, the lack of lab capacity 
during the early stages of Ebola 2014 was most definitely a contributing factor to the 
early and rapid spread of the disease (Goodfellow, Reusken, & Koopmans, 2015). This 
is particularly pressing given the fact that other pathogens were circulating around West 
Africa at the time and also deserve lab attention. In the meantime, several countries 
have provided resources from twenty-seven labs around the world to test patients, and 
were able to conduct tests with the very limited resources in local labs; yet, the doctors 
and technicians in these labs advocated for a ‘post-Ebola legacy’ of sustained 
laboratory support (Goodfellow et al., 2015).  




Another medical challenge posed includes poor health promotion in vulnerable 
populations. All this information concerning what went wrong is useless if it cannot be 
effectively communicated and taught to persons that would benefit from knowing it; for 
that matter, in theory, spending money on preventative measures should lead to saving 
money on treatment measures. A lack of health promotion was endemic worldwide; in 
the United States, one of the best prepared countries to handle an outbreak, nearly 
ninety-five percent of healthcare spending goes to direct medical care services, while 
just five percent goes to health communication and prevention (McGinnis et al., 2002). It 
is difficult to discuss health promotion in a straightforward, digestible manner, because 
prevention calls for addressing multiple types of medical issues; illness can be borne of 
viruses, genetic predisposition, activity patterns, and access to regular health 
screenings, a combination of a few or more, or other concerns (McGinnis et al., 2002). 
Health promotion necessitates that leaders in communities, both formal and informal, 
must call upon community members to be active guardians of their health. As finances 
allow, experts in developed countries have called for incentives to change bad habits for 
the better, such as advertising which restaurants have poor food sanitation, or raising 
taxes on a good that makes people ill (McGinnis et al., 2002). Promoting and sustaining 
health requires taking an active role in law, policy, and the public eye. 
Though it is improbable for the foreseeable future, vaccines may one day be a 
part of Ebola’s future and are worth discussing. Inoculation trials have been conducted 
since March 2015, with near 100 percent efficacy (Bagozzi, Harris, & Hartl, 2015). 
Though vaccinations are a great first step, the WHO is more interested in a concept 
called ‘herd immunity,’ in which the disease is wiped out by eliminating its ability to 




reproduce and flourish in a host (Bagozzi, Harris, & Hartl, 2015). However, because 
Ebola 2014 was likely started by a child eating food infected by an animal (Grady & 
Fink, 2014), it is highly unlikely herd immunity would provide the necessary protection. 
Thus, vaccinations are still the optimal prevention tool. A particularly hopeful 
characteristic of this advancement is that Guinean leaders and doctors were 
instrumental in developing the vaccine (Bagozzi, Harris, & Hartl, 2015), proving that 
progress is being made both in health and development of health in these devastated 
but developing countries.  
Certainly, other aspects of Ebola 2014 relate to medicine as well; later on, this 
paper will discuss burial practices, trust of doctors, and other practices. However, 
because these ideas bear closer resemblance to other topics, they will be brought up 
according to relevance. 
Culture 
As discussion develops, one must note the culture of these nations is by no 
means flawed or somehow wrong. Culture represents an important part of history, 
identity, and behavior, and should be respected. Offering solutions and examining 
causes and effects in this manner in no way offers ‘replacement’ cultural practices, but 
rather, frames existing ones in terms of Ebola 2014 and its potential future deterrents. 
Being Ebola-free and being inherently Guinean or Liberian are two characteristics that 
can live in harmony with one another. 
Ebola 2014 was treated as many other outbreaks in these and other nations are 
treated: with stigma and distrust for national figures denying the magnitude of the 




supposed outbreak. Thus, people ignored suggestions to limit the spread of the 
disease, enabling Ebola 2014 to flourish by turning to their cultural roots. 
This suspicion, though a part of political culture in countries with a weak or young 
state, was further enabled by health practices that exacerbated such existing cultural 
factors. For example, Liberia closed hospitals and schools, enacted local and regional 
quarantines, and closed borders; not surprisingly, this bred widespread public distrust of 
health authorities, causing some analysts to wonder what were people supposed to 
think (Siedner et. al., 2015). For that matter, consider what a person who does not 
practice Westernized medicine thought of a figure in full-body protective gear, which 
looks like a moderately-threatening, deflated space suit. These oddly-dressed figures 
then took their sick loved ones into isolation units, where alleged treatment occurred in 
a shroud of secrecy, but when people did not come out alive, rumors began to circulate 
that far more sinister activity was occurring there at the hands of the volunteers that 
admitted them (Thompson, 2014). This led to widespread distrust, which in some cases 
caused attacks on volunteer groups (Sy & Copley, 2014); this was a vicious cycle of 
wariness, followed by and caused by misunderstandings conducted by well-meaning 
groups. 
As the disease manifested in the sick, traditional healers were enlisted (Kanubah, 
2014). Thankfully, though medical professionals sent to help assumed the healers were 
doing so, traditional healers that use medicine extracted from more natural means were 
not participating in the spread of Ebola 2014 (Kanubah, 2014). In fact, many natural 
healers were more aware of the risks of the disease than the common person and 
advocated for common precautions to prevent transmission, such as quarantines and 




sanitation (Kanubah, 2014). These community leaders being truthful and forthcoming 
about their ability to treat or prevent Ebola are part of the solution to educating at-risk 
populations. 
Still, as volunteers tried harder to root out infected persons, those at-risk 
populations drove further away, often into heavily-wooded areas or mountainous 
regions that were difficult to reach (Thompson, 2014). Those found to be at risk often 
lied about their travel histories and avoided medical treatment and diagnosis altogether 
(Greeley & Chen, 2014). In response, Sierra Leone made it a crime in July 2014 to hide 
infected persons; unfortunately, punitive measures then make it more difficult for public 
health responders to do their jobs because they end up punishing rather than treating 
the sick (Thompson, 2014). 
For example, customary burial practices involve high attendance, concentrating 
persons in a tight, bacteria-rife space, so they all stand the risk of being infected; 
washing the body, enabling bacteria living on the skin to infect new persons; and in 
some cases, physically interacting and even kissing the dead body at the service 
(Garrett, 2014). This unfortunately was no different during Ebola 2014. To stop the 
spread of this highly infectious disease, burials must, despite religious or cultural 
insistence, be carried out without such a ceremony (Garrett, 2014). Medically sound, 
safe burial practice was widely ignored in the early months of Ebola 2014 because of its 
conflict with traditional cultural practice. Thus, bodies must be placed in deep-dug 
graves away from rivers to avoid spread within funerals and in the water supply; 
thankfully, this practice has become more widely accepted (Garrett, 2014). 




Military forces, mostly from the United States, stepped in to make the transition to 
Westernized medicine more timely (Guilbert, 2015). However, this was heavily 
disruptive to communities, because many military representatives carried guns and, in 
some isolated cases, exacerbated existing humanitarian concerns (Guilbert, 2015). To 
accommodate for traditional practices, therefore, Doctors Without Borders called upon 
world leaders to deploy civilian and military medical teams to be implemented in 
smaller-scale projects; to be clear, this is a dramatic step, but according to a 
spokesperson for the International Committee of the Red Cross in Africa, “The crisis 
was simply too big for humanitarian agencies to deal with on their own,” and thus 
required additional forces (Guilbert, 2015). By making use of large services in small 
groups, local execution is smoother than a general attempt, and traditional practices are 
not shut down completely, but rather, they are accommodated for in a medically sound 
and culturally sensitive way. 
 Yet, when they were alive, community members wanted nothing to do with 
quarantined or sick individuals. Doctors without Borders representatives noted even if a 
person miraculously survived Ebola, the person was stigmatized as dirty, infectious, and 
distrustful, though all other signs may have pointed to the contrary (“Ongoing 
Challenges”, 2015). Moreover, family members were also social pariahs; Ebola 2014 
victim Maima Kiawu left six children behind, whom could not get stalls to sell to them at 
markets or get friends to spend time with them even after undergoing quarantine and 
being declared Ebola-free (Aidoo, 2014). Though this kind of overcompensation could 
have been helpful in limiting transmission for those cases that necessitated quarantine, 
these habits wreaked economic and social havoc on communities. 




Solving culturally-bound conflict takes time, self-awareness, and the ability to 
take critique; this makes doing so a time-consuming, arduous process for the culture 
involved. Yet, solutions existed, and some have already been implemented. 
Two cultural practices to unravel and prevent these problems manifested on two 
levels: communication and education. 
Initially, communication was key in staying on top of new developments in the 
spread and elimination of Ebola 2014. Though international news sources maintained a 
startlingly thorough analysis and maintenance of goings-on in western Africa, news 
outlets like Liberia Public Radio were unfortunately underutilized; many doctors in the 
early stages of Ebola 2014 did not even know the disease was present in the western 
part of the continent, despite its infamy in the medical community (Thompson, 2014). 
Infrastructure that enables this communication already existed; it simply was not 
implemented properly in high-need areas (Perry, 2011). Further strengthening that 
infrastructure with better development and aid practices is key. 
As previously mentioned, large-scale implementation is most successful in 
smaller, more manageable installments. Communication infrastructure is no different. 
For example, Michiel Hofman of Doctors Without Borders explains, though medical 
impacts of foreign militaries have yet to be studied in their entirety, “the call of 
desperation as a last resort unleashed a wave of international support,” (Guilbert, 2015). 
This made use of existing communication infrastructure while allowing groups to 
organize, mobilize, and implement successfully. These groups also provided important 
training to medical and logistical staff (Guilbert, 2015). 




In terms of education, because suspicion often comes on a national level from 
impersonal interactions, this distrust could be rooted out on a local level with personal 
interactions. In Monrovia, Liberia, community meetings and forums were established as 
early as November 2014 to educate community members about the medical 
phenomenon (Aidoo, 2014). These meetings empowered survivors to share their 
stories, allowed doctors to discuss symptom recognition and medical procedure, and 
enabled sharing of resources to households that could not afford them (Aidoo, 2014). 
Margaret Harris, spokesperson for the WHO, offers a unique solution: speaking 
to sociologists and anthropologists (Anyadike, 2015). These professionals could provide 
a more complete picture of the cultural and social implications to be drawn from Ebola 
2014. Anthropological study not only draws knowledge and information from cultures, 
but does so in a way that does not interrupt or seek to change the culture at hand.  
Culture contextualizes how individuals react to their surroundings, and in this 
case, caused reactions that had devastating consequences. However, cultures like 
Guinea’s are not inherently doomed to suffer traumas like Ebola 2014. Examining other 
aspects of Ebola 2014, such as finances, will give us a more complete picture. 
Finance 
Unfortunately, keeping people healthy is an increasingly expensive practice, 
forcing one to consider the financial ramifications of keeping countries safe from threats 
like Ebola. 
A key aspect of international aid is donation from players like the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation (Perry, 2011). However, voluntary contributions are earmarked for 
the donor’s preferred projects, meaning they get to decide to which project the funding 




goes (Gostin, 2015). As of September 2015, automatic contributions from organizations 
like the UN and the WHO totaled $929 million American, whereas voluntary 
contributions total over $3 billion American (Boseley, 2015). This often leads to more 
‘popular’ concerns getting more support; for example, when malaria projects needed 
funding, it had to compete with major donors for funding reserved only for HIV/AIDS 
ventures (Perry, 2011). Ebola 2014 demanded attention, for sure, but to avoid capital 
gaps in the future, funding must come from reliable, solvent sources. Because highly 
communicable diseases are unfortunately common in developing nations, as identified 
by the fact that Ebola 2014 came from a completely natural and random occurrence, 
funding must be secured early and consistently. 
This can be solved by requiring member states such as larger-income countries 
United States, Germany, and others, based on their income, to agree to mandatory 
dues (Gostin, 2015). Too often, disaster aid involves getting as much money as an 
organization can and, simply put, throwing it at affected parties. Since UNICEF 
introduced things like targets and funding deadlines in the early 1990s for disasters, 
more financing models have been based on this system of organization, and Ebola 
2014 needed such a system (Perry, 2011). Funding can be preventatively secured, so 
the next time a US$998 million UN price tag such as Ebola 2014’s rears its ugly head, 
the international community is better prepared to respond, and is obligated to come up 
with less money in a short amount of time (Greeley & Chen, 2014). 
Developers may suggest the answer here is to provide affected areas with more 
aid. Yet, the manner in which international aid is structured and distributed may have 
led to the problem at hand, because with aid comes stipulation. 




Most developing nations depend on aid from the International Monetary Fund, or 
the IMF, to remain competitive in the international economy. In exchange for receiving 
aid, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea had to agree to certain terms, which in theory 
would strengthen their economies in the future. Economic reform programs by the IMF 
have required reductions in government spending, prioritization of debt service, and 
augmenting of foreign exchange reserves (Kentikelenis et al., 2015). Though all these 
determinants can help build an already developed nation, it comes at a price for 
industrializing countries. Conditions on IMF loans to Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia 
over the past two decades unfairly prioritized things like debt repayments and building 
foreign exchange reserves over healthcare spending (Arsenault, 2014; Kentikelenis, et 
al., 2015). Furthermore, the IMF insisted upon decentralized, inflexible healthcare, such 
as poorly-connected and greatly physically dispersed treatment centers and 
laboratories, because it is cheaper (Blattman, 2014). This is unrealistic for countries 
whose people stand at great risk for contracting highly communicable disease, because 
it starves the health system of resources such as data sharing and outreach. 
Thus, healthcare and many other publicly provided or subsidized services were 
financially out of reach for many regional and local governments, as well as individuals 
themselves, because debt repayment is such a significant part of a country’s expenses 
under this model. In contrast, countries with stronger healthcare systems, such as 
Nigeria and Senegal, experienced cases during Ebola 2014 as well, but because they 
had more developed, fairly funded health systems, they experienced only a small 
fraction of the chaos experienced by the small western African nations (Arsenault, 
2014). Whereas Spain spent over US$3,000 per person at purchasing-power parity on 




health care last year, for Sierra Leone, the figure is just under US$300 (“The Toll of a 
Tragedy,” 2015).  
In the future, the IMF must restructure debt repayment schedules to reflect both 
industrialization goals of the indebted nation and the crises at hand. To put it another 
way, aid is often distributed by the IMF with no problems, but a recent analysis of its 
operations recommends it allows time for the absorption of aid first (Salop, 2007). For 
example, if a country owes $100 million, payments of $25 million per year makes the 
loan less effective; the indebted country has the money for a shorter period of time and 
cannot juggle both the steep terms of repayment and the responsibilities of providing 
services.  
Yet, international aid is only part of the equation. Wall Street philanthropist Ray 
Chambers once said, “Aid is never something we want to be permanent, something 
people depend on. It can get you out of a crisis and over the hill, but then the private 
sector has to make is sustainable” (Perry, 2011, p). 
Thus, it is important to have a basic understanding of the finances of these states 
even before Ebola 2014. Despite poverty running rampant in developing nations, 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone enjoyed impressive growth rates, at 4.5%, 5.9%, and 
11.3% respectively (Soumare, 2014). Despite an unfortunate history of civil wars and 
mistrust of the central government, investors were interested, and economies were 
responding well to that interest, such as iron ore development funded by Chinalco, Rio 
Tinto, and the International Finance Corporation (Sy & Copley, 2014). 
After Ebola 2014, however, positive economic indicators plummeted as negative 
ones skyrocketed; the largest economic effects of the crisis, as explained by the World 




Bank, are “not as a result of the direct costs (mortality, morbidity, caregiving, and 
associated losses to working days) but rather those resulting from aversion behavior 
driven by fear of contagion” (Sy & Copley, 2014, para. 11). 
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, who has worked tirelessly for most of 
her tenure in office to revitalize the economy, was unable to draw and maintain 
international investment during Ebola 2014 (Cooper, 2014). Travel restrictions 
mandated by international groups blocked crucial trade flows (Sy & Copley, 2014). 
President Johnson Sirleaf responded to critique that she worried too much about the 
economy during Ebola 2014, stating, “If we don’t focus on our economy, we will not be 
able to sustain it when [Ebola is] gone” (Cooper, 2014, para. 8). As a preventative 
measure, President Johnson Sirleaf was correct to worry about the economy; current 
World Bank estimates state the economies of Sierra Leone and Guinea are expected to 
shrink this year, and Liberia is expected to grow at less than half the pace it enjoyed 
before Ebola 2014 (Soumare, 2014). 
Combining the effects on revenue and spending with cuts made to public 
investment to finance the response to Ebola 2014, the total fiscal impact is well over half 
a billion US dollars in 2014 alone (Soumare, 2014). Drawing investors to rebuild 
shattered, underdeveloped infrastructure in affected countries could prevent 
exacerbation of fiscal and physical resources that otherwise would have been used to 
fight Ebola 2014. 
In terms of financial administration, because so much aid and development 
moneys come from international sources, some may find it reasonable that 
implementation is then done by international groups. However, in doing so, well-




intentioned global groups sideline African governments and make national functionality 
a completely new issue in and of itself (Perry, 2011), which is the next topic of 
consideration. 
National Challenges 
Aside from national development challenges as previously discussed, the 
countries in question are infamous for living in gross poverty, being managed by selfish 
politicians, and encouraging a cycle of money mismanagement. 
Nationally, Ebola 2014 was a nearly insurmountable problem. However, one 
would not necessarily know that it was a national priority by the lack of national 
mobilization of local health infrastructure during the crisis. A study of four southern 
counties in Liberia reveals, though Ebola task forces had been established in each 
county, they failed to mobilize the local communities by providing infrastructure and 
leadership, which were conspicuously absent (Forrester et al., 2014). Though they 
cannot be expected to operate completely independently, they must be given the 
resources to provide basic care. 
Guinea, for example, must work to decentralize healthcare in a way that makes it 
more available to small, rural communities; central government agencies that only visit 
these areas are then seen as so-called ‘foreign elements,’ which heightens distrust and 
discourages positive interactions with medical staff (Schroven, 2014). 
Certain epidemic-wide trends, such as a lack of health supplies and fleeing 
medical staff, plagued western Africa (Forrester, 2014). One Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention states, 
though Ebola task forces has been established in each county in Liberia, medical 




caretakers were poorly trained, if at all, in sterilization procedures, identifying and 
treating Ebola, and informing citizens of their risk of exposure (Forrester, 2014). These 
rural centers are crucial to stemming the outbreak, and must be better supported. 
Health infrastructure in Ebola 2014’s affected nations also endures pressure from 
measles, meningitis, malaria, and other health crises (Schroven, 2014), revealing an 
exacerbated and poorly-run system. Even in crisis, child-bearers need safe places to 
deliver babies, and many sick and untreated west Africans were turned away from the 
hospital for fear of having or contracting the disease (Chothia, 2014). For instance, 
Redemption Hospital, an important health facility in Liberia’s capitol, was, and still is, a 
poorly-renovated warehouse, and it showed significant signs of water damage, improper 
lighting, and general dilapidation, an inadequate place to treat the sick (Murphy & Ricks, 
2014). In September 2014, at the height of Ebola 2014, Liberia had 51 doctors for the 
country’s 4.2 million people, and Sierra Leone had 136 doctors for its six million citizens 
(Chothia, 2014). Moreover, in a civil war, the ramifications of which are still being felt 
over ten years since its formal conclusion, 354 of Liberia’s 550 medical facilities were 
destroyed (Murphy & Ricks, 2014). Sierra Leone’s own civil war ended in 2003 with 
similar long-term results for infrastructure (Murphy & Ricks, 2014). 
Yet, there is hope. The Liberian Ministry of Health, and its leader Dr. Walter 
Gweligale, wrote a 10-year, comprehensive national health policy and roadmap for 
development with funding from USAID (Murphy & Ricks, 2014); Sierra Leone and 
Guinea should do the same. Guinea, for example, invests only 1.8% of its GDP in public 
health (Schroven 2014), and has drafted no such health renovation policy, though it 
desperately needs such. Building public health infrastructure will in turn create space for 




doctors to practice, drawing more health professionals into the area. As national efforts 
take shape, the international aid that arrives to benefit these countries should respect 
and support these initiatives where they exist. 
The infrastructure provided by global initiatives may outlive its immediate use as 
Ebola 2014 comes to a close; yet, the brick-and-mortar could still find purpose 
(Anyadike, 2015). A glut in treatment facilities only serves to exacerbate a key issue: 
ineffectively decentralized and poorly interconnected healthcare (Anyadike, 2015). 
Ebola testing labs could be incorporated into a national laboratory service, or permanent 
treatment units could be re-launched as community-based treatment facilities. This 
infrastructure does not have to go to waste. 
Even with all the aid other parties can offer, if organizations which implement 
these changes are incapable of spending money well, the funds will be wasted 
(Blattman, 2014). Though the IMF can restrict ways money can be spent, prescribing 
that same spending takes more power and boots on the ground than the IMF can 
support. The IMF cannot count, deposit, consider, and spend every dollar (or whatever 
the currency may be), and when countries like Liberia are more concerned with other 
reasonable, such as power and roads, and unreasonable, such as lining the pockets of 
politicians, financial responsibilities, healthcare simply is not covered. 
The textbook solution is government transparency (Perkins, 2014) to prevent, for 
instance, a distant national elite in Guinea from disregarding the greater populous as it 
often does (Schroven, 2014). While certain IMF requirements are unfair as previously 
discussed, transparency should be the utmost priority. This will not be easy; Guinea has 
a history of derailing international interventions because of its tendency toward 




authoritarian military rule (Schroven, 2014). Similarly, income inequality as revealed by 
Ebola 2014 highlights the padding of officials’ pockets rather than the building of 
infrastructure, a secret many nations would rather keep hidden (Perkins, 2014). 
Thus, community encouragement and oversight is the best option. In response to 
the malaria pandemic that continues to plague nations, some heads of state established 
the African Leaders Malaria Alliance; this encouraged a more cohesive set of guidelines 
and accountability measures for all participating countries, boosted regional unity, and 
was composed of the leaders of affected nations rather than tertiary parties (Perry, 
2011). Ebola 2014 deserved the same consideration, and as more is learned about the 
disease and its impacts, future outbreaks can be dealt with transparently and 
successfully in this manner. 
Already, signs of this solution are proving it to be effective. After being 
investigated by the CDC in September 2014, county health care staff received trainings 
on infection prevention and control, as well as disease detection and burial practices 
(Forrester et al., 2014). County Ebola task forces met regularly to implement an Ebola 
incident management system (Forrester et al., 2014). Decentralizing health has led to 
the provision of additional emergency vehicles for county health teams (Forrester et al., 
2014). 
For the sake of small nations with developing public infrastructure, the 
international community cannot rely on under-supported domestic health systems, then 
wait for international aid groups to come to the rescue after a problem becomes a crisis 
(Siedner et. al., 2015). The international community must be proactive. 
 





Even highly developed nations would have had difficulty dealing with Ebola 2014 
independently had it occurred within their borders. Thus, because disease epidemics 
are of international concern, implications of Ebola 2014 are worth exploring worldwide, 
because they can better prepare countries for future crises. 
First, the WHO should not have waited as long as it did to declare Ebola 2014 an 
emergency (Boseley, 2015). Official documents reveal the WHO was contacted by one 
of its experts in the field as early as April 2014, and several times over the months after 
that, begging the organization to officially declare Ebola 2014; however, it did not do so 
until August (Boseley, 2015). Furthermore, in its early stages, WHO spokesman 
Gregory Hartl insisted, “this outbreak isn’t different from previous outbreaks;” Dr. Sylvie 
Brand of the Department of Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases at the WHO later 
apologized for this statement (Boseley, 2015, para. 5). While declaring an emergency is 
not a decision that should be taken lightly, remaining silent on the issue caused far 
more economic and political distress than affected countries would have endured had 
they had the help they needed in April 2014.  The WHO must write and follow protocols 
for infectious diseases like Ebola that take into account the respective health systems 
and infrastructures. 
In increasing oversight, one must also increase communication with countries the 
WHO oversees. The WHO must give major non-state stakeholders, such as Doctors 
Without Borders, a louder voice in policymaking, as suggested by the US Government 
Accountability Office as early as 2012 (United States Government Accountability Office, 
2012). Currently, non-state actors play no formal role in WHO governing structures 




because the WHO makes it difficult to gain “official relations” status (Gostin, 2015). 
Reform is a member-state-only driven process (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2012), yet community-based organizations were instrumental in 
battling Ebola 2014 and had a first-hand understanding of the pressures associated with 
fighting an epidemic (Gostin, 2015). 
Additionally, direction of international aid is a global political prioritization issue. 
After their release in 2000, UN Millennium Development Goals 4, 5, and 6 directed a 
large majority of aid to combating HIV/AIDS, with most of the rest of it supporting 
maternal and child health services; thus, relatively little development was left to build up 
existing infrastructure (Kieny et al., 2015). 
On September 25, 2015, the United Nations released the Sustainable 
Development Goals. These goals are more general, but even more ambitious. As they 
are applied and considered in the development and prioritization of aid, general health 
infrastructure upkeep, applying specifically to outbreaks such as Ebola 2014, must be 
emphasized as well. Specifically, SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation) and SDG 9 
(industry, innovation, and infrastructure) are particularly important in developing regions 
like western Africa (Beaubien, 2015). 
The international panic surrounding Ebola 2014 impeded investigations not just 
in western Africa, but worldwide. A Dallas Morning News review showed Dallas-area 
taxpayers spent about $825,000 on two infections and one death (Floyd, 2015). In the 
United States, precautions became ridiculous; blockades were put up and traffic was 
stopped after a carsick passenger was ill on a bus near the Pentagon (Floyd, 2015). 
These situations did nothing but incur unnecessary panic and stigmatize those related 




to the disease. Precautions such as quarantining affected persons should, in the future, 
come with reassurances that Ebola can be stopped with the proper health infrastructure 
and procedure. 
Yet, the panic revealed an important problem: stemming disease spread without 
completely isolating nations. In Maine, an elementary school teacher was placed on 
three weeks’ leave after she attended a conference ten miles from where Dallas Ebola 
patients were being treated (Floyd, 2015). As discussed before, secrecy and a lack of 
transparency aids in distrust and further spread of diseases, whether a state has 
developed health infrastructure or not. Further, the economic ramifications of stopping 
aid and investment because of infection or disease have been explored and proven to 
be extremely detrimental to the overall health of the nation and the economy. A young 
economy needs constant attention, despite crisis, to thrive. 
In the 2006 film Blood Diamond, Ambassador Walker explains, “The third world is 
not a world apart.” The international community must see Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
and other affected nations as members of a global public, and in doing so, develop aid 
strategies to help and humanize populations. 
Discussion 
Equipped with pages of research, it is now time to return to the research 
question: What could have prevented the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and what can it teach 
us about future outbreaks? 
The WHO had access to information, but the organization did not take advantage 
of its resources. Alternatively, groups on the ground like traditional healers and local 
governments were starving for information, but did not have access to it. 




Thus, education and research are two key preventative measures that could 
have prevented the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and can provide insights about future 
outbreaks. 
Raw and unadulterated education thrown at the masses, however, is not the 
answer. Two implications arise from considerations of education: responsibility and 
infrastructure. 
At a time when the Western community is providing a significant amount of aid to 
northern African and Middle Eastern refugees, citizens in aid-providing countries often 
hold the opinion that too much is given to sick, ill-governed, or nonfunctional countries. 
Yet, the author would argue that global forces, whether they be public governments or 
private organizations, have a humanitarian, ethical responsibility to help. Put another 
way: can the international community trust, or force, an underdeveloped, cash-strapped, 
war-torn country such as Liberia to build and rebuild its own public education 
infrastructure? However, with the help of international investors, Liberia must. This is 
why the WHO must pay more attention and compassion to affected countries; this not 
only draws international attention, it allows officials like President Johnson Sirleaf to 
draw investors and prevent crises. 
Similarly, in terms of infrastructure, Sierra Leone had few public entities to 
provide officials or training; this is key in preventing and fighting public crises. That is, 
can a state that doesn’t provide opportunities for its citizenry be trusted to mold or 
protect the young minds of tomorrow? Without public education, those seeking higher 
formalized learning will leave affected countries to be trained elsewhere, leaving their 
home countries without their expertise. Particularly in terms of Ebola 2014, having 




domestically-trained medical professionals that understood community norms and 
behaviors would have made all the difference. That way, western Africa would not have 
had to import its medical professionals. 
Second, research in and of itself is not nuanced enough to provide the solution to 
outbreaks like Ebola 2014. Two implications can be drawn to more clearly describe the 
proper way to implement research: the Western lens, and immediacy. 
The Western lens shapes much research conducted by North American and 
European entities; this advocates, for better or for worse, on purpose or accidentally, for 
heavy antibiotic use and bureaucracy, two things that are often foreign to non-western 
cultures. In terms of Ebola 2014, Doctors Without Borders and military doctors 
encouraged these practices as well. Yet, as previously mentioned, traditional healers 
were significant in preventing Ebola’s spread because they taught sanitation and 
quarantine. Thus, would Western medical practices have formalized health for the 
worse and interrupted the few working implements of western African medical 
infrastructure? Formal research should be conducted by more developed nations only 
within the perspectives and cultural lenses of affected communities. Research is 
paramount to knowing more and doing better, but it must have unique and appropriate 
focus. 
Similarly, research on Ebola 2014 is still in its infant stages; much of the 
information presented in this document is first-hand knowledge provided by journalists 
and officials in the field, which is important. Yet, research conducted about involved 
people and organizations, such as the IMF and its inner workings, was critical in the 
development of ideas presented here, but requires months, if not years, to plan, 




conduct, and complete; time provides a lens through which to view, more opaquely and 
objectively, what actually happened in what contexts. Unfortunately, those documents 
need several months, if not years, to be drafted, written, and determined to be accurate. 
Ebola 2014 went from a single infection to thousands affected in a single rainy season; 
would more research benefit other health crises? Can we afford to wait years for 
comprehensive analysis, especially given the glacial pace at which aid is administered 
after research is concluded? For example, an Ebola vaccine is currently in human trials 
as previously mentioned, but the outbreak has considerably dwindled since then; Liberia 
hasn’t reported a new infection in months. Research is important, but time is of the 
essence. 
 
In August 2014, the United States’ national media was awash with Ebola panic; 
in some ways, this was worse than the disease itself for nations not directly affected. 
Yet, as privileged citizens in a global community, the world stage has a humanitarian 
obligation to implement a reasoned, immediate, complete response to a health crisis 
responsible for thousands of lost lives. 
After exploring the medical, cultural, financial, national, and global ramifications 
of Ebola 2014, its clear mistakes were made, but that they are largely avoidable in the 
future. For example, funding must be secured before crises, cultural practices must in 
some cases give way to medical security, and governments must give people a reason 
and a means to bestow trust upon them. 




It is difficult to maintain interest in local, national, and global health infrastructure, 
and even more difficult to improve it quickly and effectively. Despite this, Ebola 2014 
proves this discussion is worth having around the world. 
 
Author’s Note 
 This document contains information that should have been present to parties 
involved in Ebola 2014 before the crisis, but is still a resource to those who want to 
know more, do more, or both.  
However, information without action is arguably useless. What can the layperson 
do to prevent or deter another tragedy like Ebola 2014? 
 In March 2015, the Malawi Project, an African-based nonprofit, began collecting 
used, clean medicine bottles. This way, help can make its way to patients in tamper-
proof, waterproof containers. The author has been collecting these bottles, sanitizing 
them, and packaging them for shipping since May 2015, and as of the date of 
publication, has over twelve hundred bottles. She will be collecting them until May 2016, 
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